client potential XSS jQuery - javascript

I have the following problem, Client Potential XSS and tried to fix it
$('#plazo input[value=' + $('#plazoActual').text() + ']').prop('checked', true);
but I don't understand why .text() is a vulnerability
Hope someone experienced can help, how to properly sanitize the above line.

The vulnerability is not $('#plazoActual').text(), but the fact that you take that value from the page (probably editable by a user), and use it in $(). It is reported, because $() can create elements, and if it's created from concatenated user input, it allows for injection (xss).
At first sight this particular case does not seem vulnerable though, because $() above does not create an element, it is just a selector for an input field (the first character is a # and there is a space). I think this cannot be exploited in general, but jQuery was a long time ago with all kinds of vulnerabilities also depending on the exact version. Also the input can potentially be manipulated so the selector finds something else in the page, which might be useful in a more complex attack.
A more robust and more secure way would be to find all inputs in #plazo (something like $('#plazo input')), iterate through them, and set checked where the value is $('#plazoActual').text(). So the point is to not have dynamic content in the selector.

Related

XSS attack in JavaScript, how to unsanitize HTML [duplicate]

User equals untrustworthy. Never trust untrustworthy user's input. I get that. However, I am wondering when the best time to sanitize input is. For example, do you blindly store user input and then sanitize it whenever it is accessed/used, or do you sanitize the input immediately and then store this "cleaned" version? Maybe there are also some other approaches I haven't though of in addition to these. I am leaning more towards the first method, because any data that came from user input must still be approached cautiously, where the "cleaned" data might still unknowingly or accidentally be dangerous. Either way, what method do people think is best, and for what reasons?
Unfortunately, almost no one of the participants ever clearly understands what are they talking about. Literally. Only Kibbee managed to make it straight.
This topic is all about sanitization. But the truth is, such a thing like wide-termed "general purpose sanitization" everyone is so eager to talk about is just doesn't exist.
There are a zillion different mediums, each require it's own, distinct data formatting. Moreover - even single certain medium require different formatting for it's parts. Say, HTML formatting is useless for javascript embedded in HTML page. Or, string formatting is useless for the numbers in SQL query.
As a matter of fact, such a "sanitization as early as possible", as suggested in most upvoted answers, is just impossible. As one just cannot tell in which certain medium or medium part the data will be used. Say, we are preparing to defend from "sql-injection", escaping everything that moves. But whoops! - some required fields weren't filled and we have to fill out data back into form instead of database... with all the slashes added.
On the other hand, we diligently escaped all the "user input"... but in the sql query we have no quotes around it, as it is a number or identifier. And no "sanitization" ever helped us.
On the third hand - okay, we did our best in sanitizing the terrible, untrustworthy and disdained "user input"... but in some inner process we used this very data without any formatting (as we did our best already!) - and whoops! have got second order injection in all its glory.
So, from the real life usage point of view, the only proper way would be
formatting, not whatever "sanitization"
right before use
according to the certain medium rules
and even following sub-rules required for this medium's different parts.
It depends on what kind of sanitizing you are doing.
For protecting against SQL injection, don't do anything to the data itself. Just use prepared statements, and that way, you don't have to worry about messing with the data that the user entered, and having it negatively affect your logic. You have to sanitize a little bit, to ensure that numbers are numbers, and dates are dates, since everything is a string as it comes from the request, but don't try to do any checking to do things like block keywords or anything.
For protecting against XSS attacks, it would probably be easier to fix the data before it's stored. However, as others mentioned, sometimes it's nice to have a pristine copy of exactly what the user entered, because once you change it, it's lost forever. It's almost too bad there's not a fool proof way to ensure you application only puts out sanitized HTML the way you can ensure you don't get caught by SQL injection by using prepared queries.
I sanitize my user data much like Radu...
First client-side using both regex's and taking control over allowable characters
input into given form fields using javascript or jQuery tied to events, such as
onChange or OnBlur, which removes any disallowed input before it can even be
submitted. Realize however, that this really only has the effect of letting those
users in the know, that the data is going to be checked server-side as well. It's
more a warning than any actual protection.
Second, and I rarely see this done these days anymore, that the first check being
done server-side is to check the location of where the form is being submitted from.
By only allowing form submission from a page that you have designated as a valid
location, you can kill the script BEFORE you have even read in any data. Granted,
that in itself is insufficient, as a good hacker with their own server can 'spoof'
both the domain and the IP address to make it appear to your script that it is coming
from a valid form location.
Next, and I shouldn't even have to say this, but always, and I mean ALWAYS, run
your scripts in taint mode. This forces you to not get lazy, and to be diligent about
step number 4.
Sanitize the user data as soon as possible using well-formed regexes appropriate to
the data that is expected from any given field on the form. Don't take shortcuts like
the infamous 'magic horn of the unicorn' to blow through your taint checks...
or you may as well just turn off taint checking in the first place for all the good
it will do for your security. That's like giving a psychopath a sharp knife, bearing
your throat, and saying 'You really won't hurt me with that will you".
And here is where I differ than most others in this fourth step, as I only sanitize
the user data that I am going to actually USE in a way that may present a security
risk, such as any system calls, assignments to other variables, or any writing to
store data. If I am only using the data input by a user to make a comparison to data
I have stored on the system myself (therefore knowing that data of my own is safe),
then I don't bother to sanitize the user data, as I am never going to us it a way
that presents itself as a security problem. For instance, take a username input as
an example. I use the username input by the user only to check it against a match in
my database, and if true, after that I use the data from the database to perform
all other functions I might call for it in the script, knowing it is safe, and never
use the users data again after that.
Last, is to filter out all the attempted auto-submits by robots these days, with a
'human authentication' system, such as Captcha. This is important enough these days
that I took the time to write my own 'human authentication' schema that uses photos
and an input for the 'human' to enter what they see in the picture. I did this because
I've found that Captcha type systems really annoy users (you can tell by their
squinted-up eyes from trying to decipher the distorted letters... usually over and
over again). This is especially important for scripts that use either SendMail or SMTP
for email, as these are favorites for your hungry spam-bots.
To wrap it up in a nutshell, I'll explain it as I do to my wife... your server is like a popular nightclub, and the more bouncers you have, the less trouble you are likely to have
in the nightclub. I have two bouncers outside the door (client-side validation and human authentication), one bouncer right inside the door (checking for valid form submission location... 'Is that really you on this ID'), and several more bouncers in
close proximity to the door (running taint mode and using good regexes to check the
user data).
I know this is an older post, but I felt it important enough for anyone that may read it after my visit here to realize their is no 'magic bullet' when it comes to security, and it takes all these working in conjuction with one another to make your user-provided data secure. Just using one or two of these methods alone is practically worthless, as their power only exists when they all team together.
Or in summary, as my Mum would often say... 'Better safe than sorry".
UPDATE:
One more thing I am doing these days, is Base64 encoding all my data, and then encrypting the Base64 data that will reside on my SQL Databases. It takes about a third more total bytes to store it this way, but the security benefits outweigh the extra size of the data in my opinion.
I like to sanitize it as early as possible, which means the sanitizing happens when the user tries to enter in invalid data. If there's a TextBox for their age, and they type in anything other that a number, I don't let the keypress for the letter go through.
Then, whatever is reading the data (often a server) I do a sanity check when I read in the data, just to make sure that nothing slips in due to a more determined user (such as hand-editing files, or even modifying packets!)
Edit: Overall, sanitize early and sanitize any time you've lost sight of the data for even a second (e.g. File Save -> File Open)
The most important thing is to always be consistent in when you escape. Accidental double sanitizing is lame and not sanitizing is dangerous.
For SQL, just make sure your database access library supports bind variables which automatically escapes values. Anyone who manually concatenates user input onto SQL strings should know better.
For HTML, I prefer to escape at the last possible moment. If you destroy user input, you can never get it back, and if they make a mistake they can edit and fix later. If you destroy their original input, it's gone forever.
Early is good, definitely before you try to parse it. Anything you're going to output later, or especially pass to other components (i.e., shell, SQL, etc) must be sanitized.
But don't go overboard - for instance, passwords are hashed before you store them (right?). Hash functions can accept arbitrary binary data. And you'll never print out a password (right?). So don't parse passwords - and don't sanitize them.
Also, make sure that you're doing the sanitizing from a trusted process - JavaScript/anything client-side is worse than useless security/integrity-wise. (It might provide a better user experience to fail early, though - just do it both places.)
My opinion is to sanitize user input as soon as posible client side and server side, i'm doing it like this
(client side), allow the user to
enter just specific keys in the field.
(client side), when user goes to the next field using onblur, test the input he entered
against a regexp, and notice the user if something is not good.
(server side), test the input again,
if field should be INTEGER check for that (in PHP you can use is_numeric() ),
if field has a well known format
check it against a regexp, all
others ( like text comments ), just
escape them. If anything is suspicious stop script execution and return a notice to the user that the data he enetered in invalid.
If something realy looks like a posible attack, the script send a mail and a SMS to me, so I can check and maibe prevent it as soon as posible, I just need to check the log where i'm loggin all user inputs, and the steps the script made before accepting the input or rejecting it.
Perl has a taint option which considers all user input "tainted" until it's been checked with a regular expression. Tainted data can be used and passed around, but it taints any data that it comes in contact with until untainted. For instance, if user input is appended to another string, the new string is also tainted. Basically, any expression that contains tainted values will output a tainted result.
Tainted data can be thrown around at will (tainting data as it goes), but as soon as it is used by a command that has effect on the outside world, the perl script fails. So if I use tainted data to create a file, construct a shell command, change working directory, etc, Perl will fail with a security error.
I'm not aware of another language that has something like "taint", but using it has been very eye opening. It's amazing how quickly tainted data gets spread around if you don't untaint it right away. Things that natural and normal for a programmer, like setting a variable based on user data or opening a file, seem dangerous and risky with tainting turned on. So the best strategy for getting things done is to untaint as soon as you get some data from the outside.
And I suspect that's the best way in other languages as well: validate user data right away so that bugs and security holes can't propagate too far. Also, it ought to be easier to audit code for security holes if the potential holes are in one place. And you can never predict which data will be used for what purpose later.
Clean the data before you store it. Generally you shouldn't be preforming ANY SQL actions without first cleaning up input. You don't want to subject yourself to a SQL injection attack.
I sort of follow these basic rules.
Only do modifying SQL actions, such as, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE through POST. Never GET.
Escape everything.
If you are expecting user input to be something make sure you check that it is that something. For example, you are requesting an number, then make sure it is a number. Use validations.
Use filters. Clean up unwanted characters.
Users are evil!
Well perhaps not always, but my approach is to always sanatize immediately to ensure nothing risky goes anywhere near my backend.
The added benefit is that you can provide feed back to the user if you sanitize at point of input.
Assume all users are malicious.
Sanitize all input as soon as possible.
Full stop.
I sanitize my data right before I do any processing on it. I may need to take the First and Last name fields and concatenate them into a third field that gets inserted to the database. I'm going to sanitize the input before I even do the concatenation so I don't get any kind of processing or insertion errors. The sooner the better. Even using Javascript on the front end (in a web setup) is ideal because that will occur without any data going to the server to begin with.
The scary part is that you might even want to start sanitizing data coming out of your database as well. The recent surge of ASPRox SQL Injection attacks that have been going around are doubly lethal because it will infect all database tables in a given database. If your database is hosted somewhere where there are multiple accounts being hosted in the same database, your data becomes corrupted because of somebody else's mistake, but now you've joined the ranks of hosting malware to your visitors due to no initial fault of your own.
Sure this makes for a whole lot of work up front, but if the data is critical, then it is a worthy investment.
User input should always be treated as malicious before making it down into lower layers of your application. Always handle sanitizing input as soon as possible and should not for any reason be stored in your database before checking for malicious intent.
I find that cleaning it immediately has two advantages. One, you can validate against it and provide feedback to the user. Two, you do not have to worry about consuming the data in other places.

Prevent user-entered scripts from running in webpage

In my application, there is a comment box. If someone enters a comment like
<script>alert("hello")</script>
then an alert appears when I load that page.
Is there anyway to prevent this?
There are several ways to address this, but since you haven't mentioned which back-end technology you are using, it is hard to give anything but rough answers.
Also, you haven't mentioned if you want to allow, or deny, the ability to enter regular HTML in the box.
Method 1:
Sanitize inputs on the way in. When you accept something at the server, look for the script tags and remove them.
This is actually far more difficult to get right then might be expected.
Method 2:
Escape the data on the way back down to the server. In PHP there is a function called
htmlentities which will turn all HTML into which renders as literally what was typed.
The words <script>alert("hello")</script> would appear on your page.
Method 3
White-list
This is far beyond the answer of a single post and really required knowing your back-end system, but it is possible to allow some HTML characters with disallowing others.
This is insanely difficult to get right and you really are best using a library package that has been very well tested.
You should treat user input as plain text rather than HTML. By correctly escaping HTML entities, you can render what looks like valid HTML text without having the browser try to execute it. This is good practice in general, for your client-side code as well as any user provided values passed to your back-end. Issues arising from this are broadly referred to as script injection or cross-site scripting.
Practically on the client-side this is pretty easy since you're using jQuery. When updating the DOM based on user input, rely on the text method in place of the html method. You can see a simple example of the difference in this jsFiddle.
The best way is replace <script> with other string.For example in C#use:
str.replace("<script>","O_o");
Other options has a lot of disadvantage.
1.Block javascript: It cause some validation disabled too.those validation that done in frontend.Also after retrive from database it works again.I mean attacker can inject script as input in forms and it saved in database.after you return records from database in another page it render as script!!!!
2.render as text. In some technologies it needs third-party packages that it is risk in itself.Maybe these packages has backdoor!!!
convert value into string ,it solved in my case
example
var anything

Should I worry that using GET in a form element doesn't automatically URL-encode angle brackets?

So I decided to use GET in my form element, point it to my cshtml page, and found (as expected) that it automatically URL encodes any passed form values.
I then, however, decided to test if it encodes angle brackets and surprisingly found that it did not when the WebMatrix validator threw a server error warning me about a potentially dangerous value being passed.
I said to myself, "Okay, then I guess I'll use Request.Unvalidated["searchText"] instead of Request.QueryString["searchText"]. Then, as any smart developer who uses Request.Unvalidated does, I tried to make sure that I was being extra careful, but I honestly don't know much about inserting JavaScript into URLs so I am not sure if I should worry about this or not. I have noticed that it encodes apostrophes, quotations, parenthesis, and many other JavaScript special characters (actually, I'm not even sure if an angle bracket even has special meaning in JavaScript OR URLs, but it probably does in one, if not both. I know it helps denote a List in C#, but in any event you can write script tags with it if you could find a way to get it on the HTML page, so I guess that's why WebMatrix's validator screams at me when it sees them).
Should I find another way to submit this form, whereas I can intercept and encode the user data myself, or is it okay to use Request.Unvalidated in this instance without any sense of worry?
Please note, as you have probably already noticed, my question comes from a WebMatrix C#.net environment.
Bonus question (if you feel like saving me some time and you already know the answer off the top of your head): If I use Request.Unvalidated will I have to URL-decode the value, or does it do that automatically like Request.QueryString does?
---------------------------UPDATE----------------------------
Since I know I want neither a YSOD nor a custom error page to appear simply because a user included angle brackets in their "searchText", I know I have to use Request.Unvalidated either way, and I know I can encode whatever I want once the value reaches the cshtml page.
So I guess the question really becomes: Should I worry about possible XSS attacks (or any other threat for that matter) inside the URL based on angle brackets alone?
Also, in case this is relevant:
Actually, the value I am using (i.e. "searchText") goes straight to a cshtml page where the value is ran through a (rather complex) SQL query that queries many tables in a database (using both JOINS and UNIONS, as well as Aliases and function-based calculations) to determine the number of matches found against "searchText" in each applicable field. Then I remember the page locations of all of these matches, determine a search results order based on relevance (determined by type and number of matches found) and finally use C# to write the search results (as links, of course) to a page.
And I guess it is important to note that the database values could easily contain angle brackets. I know it's safe so far (thanks to HTML encoding), but I suppose it may not be necessary to actually "search" against them. I am confused as to how to proceed to maximum security and functional expecations, but if I choose one way or the other, I may not know I chose the wrong decision until it is much too late...
URL and special caracters
The url http://test.com/?param="><script>alert('xss')</script> is "benign" until it is read and ..
print in a template : Hello #param. (Potential reflected/persisted XSS)
or use in Javascript : divContent.innerHTML = '<a href="' + window.location.href + ... (Potential DOM XSS)
Otherwise, the browser doesn't evaluate the query string as html/script.
Request.Unvalidated/Request.QueryString
You should use Request.Unvalidated["searchText"] if you are expecting to receive special caracters.
For example : <b>User content</b><p>Some text...</p>
If your application is working as expected with QueryString["searchText"], you should keep it since it validate for potential XSS.
Ref: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/system.web.httprequest.unvalidated.aspx

Preventing DOM XSS

We recently on-boarded someone else's code which has since been tested, and failed, for DOM XSS attacks.
Basically the url fragments are being passed directly into jQuery selectors and enabling JavaScript to be injected, like so:
"http://website.com/#%3Cimg%20src=x%20onerror=alert%28/XSSed/%29%3E)"
$(".selector [thing="+window.location.hash.substr(1)+"]");
The problem is that this is occurring throughout their scripts and would need a lot of regression testing to fix e.g. if we escape the data if statements won't return true any more as the data won't match.
The JavaScript file in question is concatenated at build time from many smaller files so this becomes even more difficult to fix.
Is there a way to prevent these DOM XSS attacks with some global code without having to go through and debug each instance.
I proposed that we add a little regular expression at the top of the script to detect common chars used in XSS attacks and to simply kill the script if it returns true.
var xss = window.location.href.match(/(javascript|src|onerror|%|<|>)/g);
if(xss != null) return;
This appears to work but I'm not 100% happy with the solution. Does anyone have a better solution or any useful insight they can offer?
If you stick to the regular expression solution, which is far from ideal but may be the best choice given your constraints:
Rather than defining a regular expression matching malicious hashes (/(javascript|src|onerror|%|<|>)/g), I would define a regular expression matching sound hashes (e.g. /^[\w_-]*$/).
It will avoid false-positive errors (e.g. src_records), make it clear what is authorized and what isn't, and block more complex injection mechanisms.
Your issue is caused by that jQuery's input string may be treated as HTML, not only as selector.
Use native document.querySelector() instead of jQuery.
If support for IE7- is important for you, you can try Sizzle selector engine which likely, unlike jQuery and similar to native querySelector(), does not interpret input string as something different from a selector.

jQuery sanitizing comments and linkifying URLs

In terms of jQuery (or Javascript), what happens behind the scenes when a person posts a comment on Facebook, Twitter, or a blog?
For instance, do they sanitize the text first, and then pattern match URL's into an actual link? Are there other items of concern that the client-side should check in addition to doing some checks on the backend?
I have found a few regex's for turning URL's into links, but I'm not sure if there are better solutions.
I'm trying to wrap my head around the problem, but I'm having a difficult time knowing where to start. Any guidance you can provide is greatly appreciated!
This is a matter of opinion (in my opinion) so I'll CW this answer. Here's my opnion as a bona-fide citizen of the Internet:
There are two broad kinds of "sanitization": one is semantic sanitization, where input is checked to make sure it's what it's supposed to be (phone number, postal code, currency amount, whatever). The other is defensive sanitization, which is (again, in my opinion) a generally misguided, user-hostile activity.
Really, input is never really scary until it touches something: the database server, an HTML renderer, a JavaScript interpreter, and so on. The list is long.
As to point 1, I think that defensive sanitization is misguided because it ignores point 2 above: without knowing what environment you're defending from malicious input, you can't really sanitize it without greatly restricting the input alphabet, and even then the process may be fighting against itself. It's user-hostile because it needlessly restricts what legitimate users can do with the data they want to keep in their account. Who is to say that me wanting to include in my "comments" or "nickname" or "notes" fields characters that look like XML, or SQL, or any other language's special characters? If there's no semantic reason to filter inputs, why do that to your users?
Point 2 is really the crux of this. User input can be dangerous because server-side code (or client-side code, for that matter) can hand it over directly to unsuspecting interpretation environments where meta-characters important to each distinct environment can cause unexpected behavior. If you hand untouched user input directly to SQL by pasting it directly into a query template, then special SQL meta-characters like quotes can be used by a malicious user to control the database in ways you definitely don't want. However, that alone is no reason to prevent me from telling you that my name is "O'Henry".
The key issue with point 2 is that there are many different interpretation environments, and each of them is completely distinct as far as the threat posed by user input. Let's list a few:
SQL - quote marks in user input are a big potential problem; specific DB servers may have other exploitable syntax conventions
HTML - when user input is dropped straight into HTML, the browser's HTML parser will happily obey whatever embedded markup tells it to do, including run scripts, load tracker images, and whatever else. The key meta-characters are "<", ">", and "&" (the latter not so much because of attacks, but because of the mess they cause). It's probably also good to worry about quotes here too because user input may need to go inside HTML element attributes.
JavaScript - if a page template needs to put some user input directly into some running JavaScript code, the things to worry about are probably quotes (if the input is to be treated as a JavaScript string). If the user input needs to go into a regular expression, then a lot more scrubbing is necessary.
Logfiles - yes, logfiles. How do you look at logfiles? I do it on a simple command-line window on my Linux box. Such command-line "console" applications generally obey ancient "escape sequences" that date back to old ASCII terminals, for controlling cursor position and various other things. Well, embedded escape sequences in cleverly crafted user input can be used for crazy attacks that leverage those escape sequences; the general idea is to have some user input get dropped into some log file (maybe as part of a page error log) and trick an administrator into scrolling through the logfile in an xterm window. Wild, huh?
The key point here is that the exact techniques necessary to protect those environments from malformed or malicious input differ significantly from one to the next. Protecting your SQL server from malicious quotes is a completely different problem from guarding those quotes in HTML or JavaScript (and note that both of those are totally different from each other too!).
The bottom line: my opinion, therefore, is that the proper focus of attention when worrying about potentially malformed or malicious input is the process of writing user data, not reading it. As each fragment of user-supplied data is used by your software in cooperation with each interpreting environment, a "quoting" or "escaping" operation has to be done, and it has to be an operation specific to the target environment. How exactly that's arranged may vary all over the place. Traditionally in SQL, for example, one uses prepared statements, though there are times when the deficiencies of prepared statements make that approach difficult. When spitting out HTML, most server-side frameworks have all sorts of built-in hooks for HTML or XML escaping with entity notation (like & for "&"). Nowadays, the simplest way to protect things for Javascript is to leverage a JSON serializer, though of course there are other ways to go.

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