Related
We want to give our users the ability to execute self created JavaScript code within our application. For this we need to use eval to evaluate the code. To reduce all security concerns to a minimum (if not zero), our idea is to prevent the usage of any window or document function within the code. So no XMLHttpRequest or anything similar.
This is the code:
function secure_eval(s) {
var ret;
(function(){
var copyXMLHttpRequest = XMLHttpRequest; // save orginal function in copy
XMLHttpRequest = undefined; // make orignal function unavailable
(function() {
var copyXMLHttpRequest; // prevent access to copy
try {
ret = eval(s)
} catch(e) {
console.log("syntax error or illegal function used");
}
}())
XMLHttpRequest = copyXMLHttpRequest; // restore original function
}())
return ret;
}
This works as follows:
secure_eval('new XMLHttpRequest()'); // ==> "illegal function used"
Now I have several questions:
Is this pattern the right way to secure eval?
What functions of window and document are the ones which are considered harmful?
To ship around question 2. I tried to mask all (native) functions of window But I am not able to enumerate them:
This does not list XMLHttpRequest for instance:
for( var x in window) {
if( window[x] instanceof Function) {
console.log(x);
}
}
Is there a way to get a list of all native functions of window and document?
EDIT:
One of my ideas is to perform the eval within a Worker and prevent access to XMLHttpRequest and document.createElement (see my solution above). This would have (to my mind) the following consequences:
no access to the original document
no access to the original window
no chance to communicate with external resources (no ajax, no scripts)
Do you see any drawback or leaks here?
EDIT2:
In the meantime I have found this question which answer solves many of my problems plus a couple of things I did not even think about (i.e. browser dead lock with "while(true){}".
Your code does not actually prevent the use of XMLHttpRequest. I can instantiate an XMLHttpRequest object with these methods:
secure_eval("secure_eval = eval"); // Yep, this completely overwrites secure_eval.
secure_eval("XMLHttpRequest()");
Or:
secure_eval("new (window.open().XMLHttpRequest)()")
Or:
secure_eval("new (document.getElementById('frame').contentWindow.XMLHttpRequest)()")
This 3rd method relies on the presence of an iframe in the HTML of the page, which someone could add by manipulating the DOM in their browser. I do such manipulations every now and then with Greasemonkey to remove annoyances or fix broken GUIs.
This took me about 5 minutes to figure out, and I am not by any means a security guru. And these are only the holes I was able to find quickly, there are probably others, that I don't know about. The lesson here is that it is really really really hard to secure code through eval.
Using A Worker
Ok, so using a Worker to run the code is going to take care of the 2nd and 3rd cases above because there's no window accessible in a Worker. And... hmm.. the 1st case can be handled by shadowing secure_eval inside its scope. End of story? If only...
If I put secure_eval inside a web worker and run the following code, I can reacquire XMLHttpRequest:
secure_eval("var old_log = console.log; console.log = function () { foo = XMLHttpRequest; old_log.apply(this, arguments); };");
console.log("blah");
console.log(secure_eval("foo"));
The principle is to override a function that is used outside secure_eval to capture XMLHttpRequest by assigning it to a variable that will be deliberately leaked to the global space of the worker, wait until that function is used by the worker outside secure_eval, and then grab the saved value. The first console.log above simulates the use of the tampered function outside secure_eval and the 2nd console.log shows that the value was captured. I've used console.log because why not? But really any function in the global space could be modified like this.
Actually, why wait until the worker may use some function we tampered with? Here's another, better, quicker way to do access XMLHttpRequest:
secure_eval("setTimeout(function () { console.log(XMLHttpRequest);}, 0);");
Even in a worker (with a pristine console.log), this will output the actual value of XMLHttpRequest to the console. I'll also note that the value of this inside the function passed to setTimeout is the global scope object (i.e. window when not in a worker, or self in a worker), unaffected by any variable shadowing.
What About the Other Question Mentioned in This Question?
What about the solution here? Much much better but there is still a hole when run in Chrome 38:
makeWorkerExecuteSomeCode('event.target.XMLHttpRequest',
function (answer) { console.log( answer ); });
This will show:
function XMLHttpRequest() { [native code] }
Again, I'm no security guru or cracker bent on causing trouble. There are probably still more ways I'm not thinking about.
I'll try and answer your questions in order here.
Is this pattern the right way to secure eval?
This part is slightly subjective. I don't see any major security drawbacks to this. I tried several ways to access XMLHttpRequest, but i couldn't:
secure_eval('XMLHttpRequest')
secure_eval('window.XMLHttpRequest')
secure_eval('eval("XMLHttpRequest")()')
secure_eval('window.__proto__.XMLHttpRequest') // nope, it's not inherited
However, it will be a lot if you want to blacklist more things.
What functions of window and document are the ones which are considered harmful?
That depends on what you consider "harmful". Is it bad if the DOM is accessible at all? Or what about WebKit desktop notifications, or speech synthesis?
You'll have to decide this based on your specific use case.
To ship around question 2. I tried to mask all (native) functions of window, but I am not able to enumerate them:
That's because most of the methods are non-enumerable. To enumerate, you can use Object.getOwnPropertyNames(window):
var globals = Object.getOwnPropertyNames(window);
for (var i = 0; i < globals.length; i++) {
if( window[globals[i]] instanceof Function) {
console.log(globals[i]);
}
}
One of my ideas is to perform the eval within a Worker and prevent access to XMLHttpRequest and document.createElement (see my solution above).
This sounds like a good idea.
I stumbled across a really, really nice blog article about the notorious Eval here. The article does discuss in detail. You won't be able to alleviate all security concerns, but you can prevent Cross-Script Attacks by building tokens for the input. This would in theory prevent malicious code that could be harmful from being introduced.
Your only other hurdle will be Man-In-The-Middle Attacks. I'm not sure if that would be possible, as you can't trust input and output.
The Mozilla Developer Network does explicitly state:
eval() is a dangerous function, which executes the code it's passed
with the privileges of the caller. If you run eval() with a string
that could be affected by a malicious party, you may end up running
malicious code on the user's machine with the permissions of your
webpage / extension. More importantly, third party code can see the
scope in which eval() was invoked, which can lead to possible attacks
in ways to which the similar Function is not susceptible.
eval() is also generally slower than the alternatives, since it has to
invoke the JS interpreter, while many other constructs are optimized
by modern JS engines.
There are safer (and faster!) alternatives to eval() for common
use-cases.
I'm slightly against Eval and truly try to use it when warranted.
I have stated it yet in my question, but to make it more clear I will post it as an answer also:
I think the accepted answer on this question is the correct and only way to completely isolate and constrain eval().
It is also secure against these hacks:
(new ('hello'.constructor.constructor)('alert("hello from global");'))()
(function(){return this;})().alert("hello again from global!");
while(true){} // if no worker --> R.I.P. browser tab
Array(5000000000).join("adasdadadasd") // memory --> boom!
There was a question long ago much like this. So I dusted off some old code and fixed it up.
It essentially works by taking advantage of the with keyword and providing it with a frozen empty object. The prototype of the empty object is filled with null properties, the keys of which match the names global variables like self, window and their enumerable property keys; The prototype object is also frozen. eval is then called within the with statement (Almost the same way that scripts run with an implicit with(window){} block if I understand correctly). When you try to access window or its properties you get redirected (via the with block) to null versions (with same key) found in empty object (or rather the empty object's prototype):
function buildQuarantinedEval(){
var empty=(function(){
var exceptionKeys = [
"eval", "Object", //need exceptions for these else error. (ie, 'Exception: redefining eval is deprecated')
"Number", "String", "Boolean", "RegExp", "JSON", "Date", "Array", "Math",
"this",
"strEval"
];
var forbiddenKeys=["window","self"];
var forbidden=Object.create(null);
[window,this,self].forEach(function(obj){
Object.getOwnPropertyNames(obj).forEach(function(key){
forbidden[key]=null;
});
//just making sure we get everything
Object.keys(obj).forEach(function(key){
forbidden[key]=null;
});
for(var key in obj){
forbidden[key]=null;
}
});
forbiddenKeys.forEach(function(key){
forbidden[key]=null;
});
exceptionKeys.forEach(function(key){
delete forbidden[key];
});
Object.freeze(forbidden);
var empty=Object.create(forbidden);
Object.freeze(empty);
return empty;
})();
return function(strEval){
return (function(empty,strEval){
try{
with(empty){
return eval(strEval);
}
}
catch(err){
return err.message;
}
}).call(empty,empty,strEval);
};
}
Setup by building a function/closure that evaluates some expression:
var qeval=buildQuarantinedEval();
qeval("'some expression'"); //evaluate
Tests:
var testBattery=[
"'abc'","8*8","console","window","location","XMLHttpRequest",
"console","eval('1+1+1')","eval('7/9+1')","Date.now()","document",
"/^http:/","JSON.stringify({a:0,b:1,c:2})","HTMLElement","typeof(window)",
"Object.keys(window)","Object.getOwnPropertyNames(window)",
"var result; try{result=window.location.href;}catch(err){result=err.message;}; result;",
"parseInt('z')","Math.random()",
"[1,2,3,4,8].reduce(function(p,c){return p+c;},0);"
];
var qeval=buildQuarantinedEval();
testBattery.map(function(code){
const pad=" ";
var result= qeval(code);
if(typeof(result)=="undefined")result= "undefined";
if(result===null)result= "null";
return (code+pad).slice(0,16)+": \t"+result;
}).join("\n");
Results:
/*
'abc' : abc
8*8 : 64
console : null
window : null
location : null
XMLHttpRequest : null
console : null
eval('1+1+1') : 3
eval('7/9+1') : 1.7777777777777777
Date.now() : 1415335338588
document : null
/^http:/ : /^http:/
JSON.stringify({: {"a":0,"b":1,"c":2}
HTMLElement : null
typeof(window) : object
Object.keys(wind: window is not an object
Object.getOwnPro: can't convert null to object
var result; try{: window is null
parseInt('z') : parseInt is not a function
Math.random() : 0.8405481658901747
[1,2,3,4,8].redu: 18
*/
Notes: This technique can fail when some properties of window are defined late (after initializing/creating our quarantined eval function). In the past, I've noticed some property keys are not enumerated until after you access the property, after which Object.keys or Object.getOwnPropertyNames will finally be able grab their keys. On the other hand this technique can also be quite aggressive in blocking objects/functions you do not want blocked (an example would be like parseInt); In these cases, you'll need to manually add global objects/functions that you do want into the exceptionKeys array.
*edit* Additional considerations: How well this all performs depends entirely on how well the mask matches that of the property keys of the window object. Any time you add an element to the document and give it a new ID, you just inserted a new property into the global window object, potentially allowing our 'attacker' to grab it and break out of the quarantine/firewall we've setup (i.e. access element.querySelector then eventually window obj from there). So the mask (i.e., the variable forbidden) either needs to be updated constantly perhap with watch method or rebuilt each time; The former conflicts with the necessity of the mask to have a frozen interface, and the latter is kinda expensive having to enumerate all the keys of window for each evaluation.
Like I said earlier, this is mostly old code I was working on, then abandoned, that was quickly fixed up on short order. So it's not by any means thoroughly tested. I'll leave that to you.
and a jsfiddle
I have small idea about secure eval for small or limited things if you know well what u going to use eval in you can create white list and black list and excute only the strings that has the valid but it good for small covered app for example calculator has few options (x, y) and (+,*,-,/) if i added this characters in white list and add check for script length and study what excepted length of the script run it can be secure and no one can pass that
const x = 5;
const y = 10;
function secureEval(hack_string){
// 0 risk eval calculator
const whiteList = ['',' ', 'x', 'y','+','*','/','-'];
for (let i=0; i<hack_string.length; i++){
if (!whiteList.includes(hack_string[i])){
return 'Sorry u can not hack my systems';
}
}
return 'good code system identify result is : ' + eval(hack_string);
}
// bad code
document.getElementById("secure_demo").innerHTML = secureEval('x * y; alert("hacked")');
document.getElementById("demo").innerHTML = secureEval('x * y');
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<body>
<h1>Secure Eval</h1>
<p id="secure_demo"></p>
<p id="demo"></p>
</body>
</html>
I'd like a quick way to add something like
console.log(functionName)
to the top of every function.
Is there a quick and easy way to do this, or would I need to manually add that code to every function.
You could try something like this:
for( var x in window) {
if( typeof window[x] == "function") {
(function(x) {
var ox = window[x];
window[x] = function() {
console.log(x);
ox.apply(null,arguments);
};
})(x);
}
}
However, this would only work on global functions, not functions of objects or scoped functions. It's also kind of a nuke, so is a poor substitute for manually adding console logging to the specific functions you want to call.
Instead it would probably be better to insert a breakpoint in the code (using the browser's developer tools) and checking the call stack at that point.
I'm afraid that this is not possible with JavaScript as it doesn't support runtime modification of function contents.
You could, however, make a backup of your scripts and do a search & replace to save some time on the editing part; modern editors support basic regular expressions to help you out.
If you use a flow control library like Frame.js the you have a low level access to the most important functions in your application. Of course you would have to build the application with Frame from the beginning. This won't work if you are trying to modify an already built application.
Every time anyone mentions testing against undefined, it's pointed out that undefined is not a keyword so it could be set to "hello", so you should use typeof x == "undefined" instead. This seems ridiculous to me. Nobody would ever do that, and if they did it would be reason enough to never use any code they wrote... right?
I found one example of someone who accidentally set undefined to null, and this was given as a reason to avoid assuming that undefined isn't overwritten. But if they'd done that, the bug would have gone undetected, and I fail to see how that's better.
In C++ everyone is well aware that it's legal to say #define true false, but nobody ever advises you avoid true and use 0 == 0 instead. You just assume that nobody would ever be a big enough jerk to do that, and if they do, never trust their code again.
Has this ever actually bitten somebody where someone else assigned to undefined (on purpose) and it broke your code, or is this more of a hypothetical threat? I'm willing to take my chances to make my code marginally more readable. Is this a really bad idea?
To reiterate, I am not asking for how to protect against reassigned undefined. I've seen those tricks written 100 times already. I'm asking how dangerous it is to not use those tricks.
No, I never have. This is mostly because I develop on modern browsers, which are mostly ECMAScript 5 compliant. The ES5 standard dictates that undefined is now readonly. If you use strict mode (you should), an error will be thrown if you accidentally try to modify it.
undefined = 5;
alert(undefined); // still undefined
'use strict';
undefined = 5; // throws TypeError
What you should not do is create your own scoped, mutable undefined:
(function (undefined) {
// don't do this, because now `undefined` can be changed
undefined = 5;
})();
Constant is fine. Still unnecessary, but fine.
(function () {
const undefined = void 0;
})();
No proper code will do such a thing. But you can never know what some wannabe-smart developer or a plugin/library/script you are using did. On the other side, it's extremely unlikely and modern browsers will not allow overwriting undefined at all, so if you are using such a browser for development you'll quickly notice if any code tries to overwrite it.
And even though you did not ask for it - many people will probably find this question when looking for the more common "how to protect against redefined undefined" issue, so I'll answer that anyway:
There's a very good way to get a truly undefined undefined no matter how old the browser is:
(function(undefined) {
// your code where undefined is undefined
})();
This works because an argument that is not specified is always undefined. You can also do it with a function that accepts some real arguments, e.g. like this when you are using jQuery. It's usually a good idea to ensure a sane environment in this way:
(function($, window, undefined) {
// your code where undefined is undefined
})(jQuery, this);
Then you can be sure that inside that anonymous function the following things are true:
$ === jQuery
window === [the global object]
undefined === [undefined].
However, note that sometimes typeof x === 'undefined' is actually necessary: If the variable x has never been set to a value (contrary to being set to undefined), reading x in a different way such as if(x === undefined) will throw an error. This does not apply to object properties though, so if you know that y is always an object, if(y.x === undefined) is perfectly safe.
There's a simple solution to that: compare against void 0 which is always undefined.
Note that you should avoid == as it may coerce the values. Use === (and !==) instead.
That said, the undefined variable may be set by error if someone writes = instead of == when comparing something against undefined.
Only you know what code you use, and therefore how dangerous it is. This question can't be answered in the way you've clarified you want it answered.
1) Create a team policy, disallow redefining undefined, reserving it for its more popular usage. Scan your existing code for undefined left assignment.
2) If you don't control all the scenarios, if your code is used outside situations you or your policies control, then obviously your answer is different. Scan the code that does use your scripts. Heck, scan web for statistics of undefined left assignment if you wish, but I doubt that's been done for you, because it's easier to just pursue answer #1 or #3 here instead.
3) And if that answer isn't good enough, it's probably because, again, you require a different answer. Maybe you are writing a popular library that will be used inside corporate firewalls, and you don't have access to the calling code. Then use one of the other fine answers here. Note the popular jQuery library practices sound encapsulation, and begins:
(function( window, undefined ) {
Only you can answer your question in the specific way you seek. What more is there to say?
edit: p.s. if you really want my opinion, I'll tell you it's not dangerous at all. Anything that would be so likely to cause defects (such as assigning to undefined, which is obviously a well-documented risky behaviour) is itself a defect. It's the defect that is the risk. But that's just in my scenarios, where I can afford to hold that perspective. As I'd recommend you do, I answered the question for my use-cases.
It's safe to test against undefined. As you already mention. If you get to some code that overrides it (which is highly improvable), just don't use it anymore.
Maybe if you are creating a library for public use, you can use some of the techniques to avoid the user change it. But even in this case, it's their problem, not your library.
You can use undefined in your code when coding for browsers supporting ECMAScript 5.1 as it is immutable according to the language specification.
Also see this compatibility table or this caniuse ECMAScript 5 to see that all modern browsers (IE 9+) have implemented immutable undefined.
It's not dangerous at all. It can only be overwritten when running on an ES3 engine and that's not likely to be used any more.
First of all, if your code breaks it's probably not because some other developer out there "is trying to be a jerk" as you put it.
It's true that undefined is not a keyword. But it is a global level primitive. It was intended to be used like this (see "undefined" at developer.mozilla.org):
var x;
if (x === undefined) {
// these statements execute
}
else {
// these statements do not execute
}
The common alternative to that (also from MDN) and in my opinion the better way is:
// x has not been declared before
if (typeof x === 'undefined') { // evaluates to true without errors
// these statements execute
}
if(x === undefined){ // throws a ReferenceError
}
Which has a couple of advantages, the obvious one (from the comments) is that it does not trigger an exception when x is not declared. It's also worth noting that MDN also points out that it is important to use === over == in the first case because:
var x=null;
if (x === undefined) {
// this is probably what you meant to do
// these lines will not execute in this case
}
else if (x == undefined) {
// these statements will execute even though x *is* defined (as null)
}
else {
// these statements do not execute
}
This is another often overlooked reason why it is probably better to just use the second alternative in all cases.
Conclusion: It's not wrong to code it the first way, and certainly not dangerous. The argument you've seen that you use as an example against it (that it can be overwritten) is not the strongest argument for coding the alternative with typeof. But using typeof is stronger for one reason specifically: it doesn't throw an exception when your var is not declared. It could also be argued that using == instead of === is a common mistake in which case it's not doing what you expected it to. So why not use typeof?
I'm new at Greasemonkey. I'm trying to create a user script to improve my user experience with a site I often visit.
So I'd like to create a javascript function f(). My function requires a value that, according to my quick research and try at understanding the site's structure, only exists inside a javascript function g().
I am not sure of which file holds g() on the server, but what I do know is that once the page has finished downloading, g() can be used.
I would like to extract the string value from g() without executing it (with g.toString()).
My question is: how can I access g(), without compromising my computer with unsafeWindow?
(window.g returns null inside the Greasemonkey script).
You have to use unsafeWindow. It's really not that evil.
var string = unsafeWindow.g.toString();
unsafeWindow is relatively safe. I have previously discovered a method to access an unrestricted window object in GreaseMonkey. Using a specific method, it's possible to read the original code of the Userscript by the affected page. Specific GreaseMonkey functions (GM_getValue, ..) cannot be used though: Advanced GreaseMonkey: Using constructors/methods/variables at a remote page
EDIT, regarding the title change
If you fear that g is not a function, or that the toString method of the function is overwritten, use the following code:
//Store unsafeWindow.g in a variable, to reduce the possibly defined
// __defineGetter__ calls to a minimum.
var g_string = unsafeWindow.g;
if(typeof g_string == "function"){
g_string = Function.prototype.toString.call(g_string);
}
else g_string = ""; //Reset
Is it safe?
The previous code is the safest approach, because no methods of g are invoked. The GreaseMonkey wrapper also prevents the affected page from reading the script:
window.g = function(){}
window.__defineGetter__("g", function(){
alert(arguments.callee.caller);
});
The previous code will not show the real caller, but an useless wrapper function:
function SJOWContentBoundary() {
[native code]
}
I would really like to provide the user some scripting capabilities, while not giving it access to the more powerful features, like altering the DOM. That is, all input/output is tunneled thru a given interface. Like a kind of restricted javacsript.
Example:
If the interface is checkanswer(func)
this are allowed:
checkanswer( function (x,y)={
return x+y;
}
but these are not allowed:
alert(1)
document.write("hello world")
eval("alert()")
EDIT: what I had in mind was a simple language that was implemented using javascript, something like http://stevehanov.ca/blog/index.php?id=92
(Edit This answer relates to your pre-edit question. Don't know of any script languages implemented using Javascript, although I expect there are some. For instance, at one point someone wrote BASIC for Javascript (used to have a link, but it rotted). The remainder of this answer is therefore pretty academic, but I've left it just for discussion, illustration, and even cautionary purposes. Also, I definitely agree with bobince's points — don't do this yourself, use the work of others, such as Caja.)
If you allow any scripting in user-generated content, be ready for the fact you'll be entering an arms race of people finding holes in your protection mechanisms and exploiting them, and you responding to those exploits. I think I'd probably shy away from it, but you know your community and your options for dealing with abuse. So if you're prepared for that:
Because of the way that Javascript does symbol resolution, it seems like it should be possible to evaluate a script in a context where window, document, ActiveXObject, XMLHttpRequest, and similar don't have their usual meanings:
// Define the scoper
var Scoper = (function() {
var rv = {};
rv.scope = function(codeString) {
var window,
document,
ActiveXObject,
XMLHttpRequest,
alert,
setTimeout,
setInterval,
clearTimeout,
clearInterval,
Function,
arguments;
// etc., etc., etc.
// Just declaring `arguments` doesn't work (which makes
// sense, actually), but overwriting it does
arguments = undefined;
// Execute the code; still probably pretty unsafe!
eval(codeString);
};
return rv;;
})();
// Usage:
Scoper.scope(codeString);
(Now that uses the evil eval, but I can't immediately think of a way to shadow the default objects cross-browser without using eval, and if you're receiving the code as text anyway...)
But it doesn't work, it's only a partial solution (more below). The logic there is that any attempt within the code in codeString to access window (for instance) will access the local variable window, not the global; and the same for the others. Unfortunately, because of the way symbols are resolved, any property of window can be accessed with or without the window. prefix (alert, for instance), so you have to list those too. This could be a long list, not least because as bobince points out, IE dumps any DOM element with a name or an ID onto window. So you'd probably have to put all of this in its own iframe so you can do an end-run around that problem and "only" have to deal with the standard stuff. Also note how I made the scope function a property of an object, and then you only call it through the property. That's so that this is set to the Scoper instance (otherwise, on a raw function call, this defaults to window!).
But, as bobince points out, there are just so many different ways to get at things. For instance, this code in codeString successfully breaks the jail above:
(new ('hello'.constructor.constructor)('alert("hello from global");'))()
Now, maybe you could update the jail to make that specific exploit not work (mucking about with the constructor properties on all — all — of the built-in objects), but I tend to doubt it. And if you could, someone (like Bob) would just come up with a new exploit, like this one:
(function(){return this;})().alert("hello again from global!");
Hence the "arms race."
The only really thorough way to do this would be to have a proper Javascript parser built into your site, parse their code and check for illegal accesses, and only then let the code run. It's a lot of work, but if your use-case justifies it...
T.J. Crowder makes an excellent point about the "arms race." It's going to be very tough to build a watertight sandbox.
it's possible to override certain functions, though, quite easily.
Simple functions:
JavaScript: Overriding alert()
And according to this question, even overriding things like document.write is as simple as
document.write = function(str) {}
if that works in the browsers you need to support (I assume it works in all of them), that may be the best solution.
Alternative options:
Sandboxing the script into an IFrame on a different subdomain. It would be possible to manipulate its own DOM and emit alert()s and such, but the surrounding site would remain untouched. You may have to do this anyway, no matter which method(s) you choose
Parsing the user's code using a white list of allowed functions. Awfully complex to do as well, because there are so many notations and variations to take care of.
There are several methods to monitor the DOM for changes, and I'm pretty sure it's possible to build a mechanism that reverts any changes immediately, quite similar to Windows's DLL management. But it's going to be awfully complex to build and very resource-intensive.
Not really. JavaScript is an extremely dynamic language with many hidden or browser-specific features that can be used to break out of any kind of jail you can devise.
Don't try to take this on yourself. Consider using an existing ‘mini-JS-like-language’ project such as Caja.
Sounds like you need to process the user entered data and replace invalid mark-up based on a white list or black-list of allowed content.
You can do it the same way as Facebook did. They're preprocessing all the javascript sources, adding a prefix to all the names other than their own wrapper APIs'.
I got another way: use google gears WorkerPool api
See this
http://code.google.com/apis/gears/api_workerpool.html
A created worker does not have access
to the DOM; objects like document and
window exist only on the main page.
This is a consequence of workers not
sharing any execution state. However,
workers do have access to all
JavaScript built-in functions. Most
Gears methods can also be used,
through a global variable that is
automatically defined:
google.gears.factory. (One exception
is the LocalServer file submitter,
which requires the DOM.) For other
functionality, created workers can ask
the main page to carry out requests.
What about this pattern in order to implement a sandbox?
function safe(code,args)
{
if (!args)
args=[];
return (function(){
for (i in window)
eval("var "+i+";");
return function(){return eval(code);}.apply(0,args);
})();
}
ff=function()
{
return 3.14;
}
console.log(safe("this;"));//Number
console.log(safe("window;"));//undefined
console.log(safe("console;"));//undefined
console.log(safe("Math;"));//MathConstructor
console.log(safe("JSON;"));//JSON
console.log(safe("Element;"));//undefined
console.log(safe("document;"));//undefined
console.log(safe("Math.cos(arguments[0]);",[3.14]));//-0.9999987317275395
console.log(safe("arguments[0]();",[ff]));//3.14
That returns:
Number
undefined
undefined
MathConstructor
JSON
undefined
undefined
-0.9999987317275395
3.14
Can you please provide an exploit suitable to attack this solution ? Just to understand and improve my knowledge, of course :)
THANKS!
This is now easily possible with sandboxed IFrames:
var codeFunction = function(x, y) {
alert("Malicious code!");
return x + y;
}
var iframe = document.createElement("iframe");
iframe.sandbox = "allow-scripts";
iframe.style.display = "none";
iframe.src = `data:text/html,
<script>
var customFunction = ${codeFunction.toString()};
window.onmessage = function(e) {
parent.postMessage(customFunction(e.data.x, e.data.y), '*'); // Get arguments from input object
}
</script>`;
document.body.appendChild(iframe);
iframe.onload = function() {
iframe.contentWindow.postMessage({ // Input object
x: 5,
y: 6
}, "*");
}
window.onmessage = function(e) {
console.log(e.data); // 11
document.body.removeChild(iframe);
}