Backbone.js, Rest API and anonymous session - javascript

I've got a backbone webapp, It consists into several form pages w/o any authentication.
All users are anonymous but i need a kind of logic to identifying them along the process.
Actually this is a comparator service.
I consume thru CORS a API in charge to deliver some contents, such as querying a Vehicule database, things related to a insurance policy and geo location...
No issues regarding consuming datas.
Now the question is more regarding how to save the anonymous users datas thru a multi-step form in the API.
The Goal would be, each time a user click on the next step, anonymous user datas will be save ( this is for analytics reasons ) and secure a bit the API with these POST requests.
As the webapp is in pure JS, i was thinking to do something like this :
if a cookie doesn't exist, i generate on the client side a session_id with with a js crypto lib and store this session_id into a new cookie ( with a expiration ) . Then a backbone model ( Session/Singleton ) will be in charge to store this session_id into a redis-cache store thru a Backbone.save(). Expiration of the Redis Key will match expiration of the cookie. Id attribute of the Session Model will be the session_id.
If the cookie exist. i'll fetch() the session from the API thru a getSession verb.
In this way i could keep tracking of every anonymous users to save the datas in my API. Do you think this is a good pattern or too naïve ?
Now, about securing the API... i'm stuck.
I was thinking about HMAC but if the secret key is stored on the client side ( backbone app ), shared for all users, someone could inspect the js client code, even uglyfied, and find the key...
I read many docs about this, but all are talking about a username/pwd/token scheme, in my case i've got only anonymous users...
Maybe, in the REST paradigm, anonymous users means that the datas are not sensitive.. .
Any advices ?
Thanks,

Anything that is stored client side is not secure. When it comes to an SPA, you usually authenticate a user using a username and password. Once the user is authenticated, you send a an Authorization token in the header of every request. If I am understanding your question correctly, you are worried about sensitive data being sent and inspected when the user is registering? If that is the case, you are best using a secure connection. I am curious to know how you think this is different for a non-backbone or SPA app? You would still be sending the data over HTTP, REST or non REST.

Related

Securing API calls without token

I'm building an app and an API endpoint using PHP(I know what you thinking!). My issue is that if I ask user for username and password on opening the app for the first time, since I can't store these details locally because they could be compromised. I'd send these through Post request to server then generate a token depending on whether the user is the right one. After getting response I must store this token locally right?
Yes!. there's expiration for the token. After the token is expired, I don't want to ask user for their name and password but want to access API still authenticating as that user. How will I do this?
If I use Oauth it's still the same procedure right? I should store something locally. won't that be compromised? I'm very confused.
How does other apps work. I'm sure they doing something in the background. They ask us for credentials only once and all subsequent API calls will be secured. Won't the token expire in that case or what?
Can i secure API calls without storing anything locally? I don't want API to be accessed from anywhere else but app.
Use android SharedPreferences. It should be very secure unless you deliberately expose it e.g. its accessible via an exported content provider missing the (android:exported="false") in the manifest. You can also use sqlite but there is no point of using a db table for one or two rows of data.You can also encrypt the user name and password to add one more security layer to protect rooted users.
Furthermore to protect the data in the network you should use ssl in the backend so no one can sniff the credentials.

Security using angularjs, login page and maintenance "Session"

Well I am trying to build a web app with angularjs. In my webApp there is a login page aside with register page. My main problem is how to implements a login page and maintenance session with the specific user, the warning dots that came up with this scenario is when the user going to log in my web app, I will probably send a post to the server and then will get a successful result if the user and password are okay. now during the whole application the user may use his own properties like: money, friends, age, etc... now in this situation I would like to use a session that contains all of the "data" of this specific user, but when I use angularjs, because the whole thing is on the side client, I dont think its a good idea to save the password and critical information about the user in the client side, but still i need any verify information for this user, to know that he is who is he.
I don't know how to implements this scenario good when i use angularjs, with php it may be more convenient, because there is session, which stays in the server side, and I have to worry a little bit lower than using angularjs. Can someone clear this situation?
You don't want to save classified data on the client. This data has to come from the server.
This means that the angular controller that supposed to show this data must retrieve is from the server.
You should have a service that will use $http to get this data from the server using Ajax.
In order to retrieve the data for a specific user your client should send a token to the server that uniquely identifies the user.
This token will be sent to the client as a result of a successful login.
The client will keep the token in a cookie or in the local storage and add it to every http request.

ASP.NET Forms Authentication with per session/page API token

Let me first start by saying that I realize that this is very similar to many other questions about service access control but I can't seem to find one response that is relevant on all of the points below, so I am asking (possibly) again.
Some background:
I am building a web application with .NET that is protected by a custom forms authentication implementation. This same app (within the same domain) needs to leverage several REST services related to data management from within JavaScript/jQuery as many of the app's functions are not well suited to post back use in the forms.
I am trying to determine the most secure way to implement access control for the REST service based on the authentication done server side when the app was first accessed.
Here is an example use case for what I am describing:
user logs into asp.net site using forms authentication and upon successful authentication the user is taken to the landing page of the application
the user chooses to access a page at ~/Users.aspx from a link on the landing page, which forms auth allows based on the cookie created by the authentication in step 1
users.aspx loads some basic HTML elements, like an empty table and a hidden field that contains a token (GUID) generated at page load. The token in the hidden field is used by JavaScript to access a REST service that retrieves data to populate the table. The token is stored in a database with a pre-defined expiration.
when the REST service is called with the token it is checked for expiration and used to determine the user making the call and provide authorization to the data being accessed from the database, if the user is authorized to access/update the data the service performs the requested service operation, extends the expiration on the token, and returns a response.
I know that the token would be visible to someone sniffing the request/response on the network unless SSL is used to encrypt the transmission, so SSL is used to counter this.
My question is:
Are there other attacks that the service would be vulnerable to?
is there a better way to handle authorization and user identification for the REST service based on the server side login other than a statically assigned token for the service? It seems to me that the statically assigned user token would be less secure since it would give endless access to the service if it were obtained by a malicious user.
assuming the answer to #2 is no, is there a better way to transmit the token to the client and store it there for the life of the page use knowing that it needs to be accessible from JavaScript/jQuery?

Facebook feed on website using javascript. Is it secure?

I have a client who would like the most recent post displayed on their site (along with like and comment counts) plus a link to the actual post. Their page is public, so I can view it in a browser without being logged in. Let's just say it's Nike.
http://www.facebook.com/nike (public)
http://graph.facebook.com/nike/feed (wait, i need to authenticate to see this?)
I went through the trouble of setting up a dummy app on a dummy account, got an access_token an was able to pull what I needed using javascript(Jquery). The reason I'm doing it this way is because the client has sensitive data and other apps/sites on this server and does not want to involve their IT department to QA my code.
Before final handoff, they'll likely set up their own facebook app on their account. This would significantly raise the stakes if someone decided they wanted to play with that access_token.
I'm mostly a front-end guy who's done some small php sites/apps, so what would you recommend I do?
Thanks for your time!
I don't know about facebook in particular, but typically if you want to protect api access credentials you would proxy the request through your server, and just send the results to the client (so the access key only exists on the server). Alternately, and I'm not sure that facebook provides this, some APIs will give you a user token, which does not expose your access key, but allows the client to call the api.

SINGLE SIGN ON SECURITY THREAT! FACEBOOK access_token broadcast in the open/clear

02/20/2011:
It was confirmed by Facebook today that indeed there is one call in which the access_token is broadcast in the open . . . it just happens to be one call I use to make sure that the USER is still logged in before saving to my application database. Their recommendation was to use the SSL option provided as of last month for canvase and facebook as a whole. For the most part the Auth and Auth are secure.
Findings:
Subsequent to my posting there was a remark made that this was not really a question but I thought I did indeed postulate one. So that there is no ambiquity here is the question with a lead in:
Since there is no data sent from Facebook during the Canvas Load process that is not at some point divulged, including the access_token, session and other data that could uniquely identify a user, does any one see any other way other than adding one more layer, i.e., a password, sent over the wire via HTTPS along with the access_toekn, that will insure unique untampered with security by the user?
Using Wireshark I captured the local broadcast while loading my Canvas Application page. I was hugely surprised to see the access_token broadcast in the open, viewable for any one to see. This access_token is appended to any https call to the Facebook OpenGraph API.
Using facebook as a single click log on has now raised huge concerns for me. It is stored in a session object in memory and the cookie is cleared upon app termination and after reviewing the FB.Init calls I saw a lot of HTTPS calls so I assumed the access_token was always encrypted.
But last night I saw in the status bar a call from what was simply an http call that included the App ID so I felt I should sniff the Application Canvas load sequence.
Today I did sniff the broadcast and in the attached image you can see that there are http calls with the access_token being broadcast in the open and clear for anyone to gain access to.
Am I missing something, is what I am seeing and my interpretation really correct. If any one can sniff and get the access_token they can theorically make calls to the Graph API via https, even though the call back would still need to be the site established in Facebook's application set up.
But what is truly a security threat is anyone using the access_token for access to their own site. I do not see the value of a single sign on via Facebook if the only thing that was established as secure was the access_token - becuase for what I can see it clearly is not secure. Access tokens that never have an expire date do not change. Access_tokens are different for every user, to access to another site could be held tight to just a single user, but compromising even a single user's data is unacceptable.
http://www.creatingstory.com/images/InTheOpen.png
Went back and did more research on this:
FINDINGS:
Went back an re ran the canvas application to verify that it was not any of my code that was not broadcasting.
In this call: HTTP GET /connect.php/en_US/js/CacheData HTTP/1.1
The USER ID is clearly visible in the cookie. So USER_ID's are fully visible, but they are already. Anyone can go to pretty much any ones page and hover over the image and see the USER ID. So no big threat. APP_ID are also easily obtainable - but . . .
http://www.creatingstory.com/images/InTheOpen2.png
The above file clearly shows the FULL ACCESS TOKEN clearly in the OPEN via a Facebook initiated call.
Am I wrong. TELL ME I AM WRONG because I want to be wrong about this.
I have since reset my app secret so I am showing the real sniff of the Canvas Page being loaded.
Additional data 02/20/2011:
#ifaour - I appreciate the time you took to compile your response.
I am pretty familiar with the OAuth process and have a pretty solid understanding of the signed_request unpacking and utilization of the access_token. I perform a substantial amount of my processing on the server and my Facebook server side flows are all complete and function without any flaw that I know of. The application secret is secure and never passed to the front end application and is also changed regularly. I am being as fanatical about security as I can be, knowing there is so much I don’t know that could come back and bite me.
Two huge access_token issues:
The issues concern the possible utilization of the access_token from the USER AGENT (browser). During the FB.INIT() process of the Facebook JavaScript SDK, a cookie is created as well as an object in memory called a session object. This object, along with the cookie contain the access_token, session, a secret, and uid and status of the connection. The session object is structured such that is supports both the new OAuth and the legacy flows. With OAuth, the access_token and status are pretty much al that is used in the session object.
The first issue is that the access_token is used to make HTTPS calls to the GRAPH API. If you had the access_token, you could do this from any browser:
https://graph.facebook.com/220439?access_token=...
and it will return a ton of information about the user. So any one with the access token can gain access to a Facebook account. You can also make additional calls to any info the user has granted access to the application tied to the access_token. At first I thought that a call into the GRAPH had to have a Callback to the URL established in the App Setup, but I tested it as mentioned below and it will return info back right into the browser. Adding that callback feature would be a good idea I think, tightens things up a bit.
The second issue is utilization of some unique private secured data that identifies the user to the third party data base, i.e., like in my case, I would use a single sign on to populate user information into my database using this unique secured data item (i.e., access_token which contains the APP ID, the USER ID, and a hashed with secret sequence). None of this is a problem on the server side. You get a signed_request, you unpack it with secret, make HTTPS calls, get HTTPS responses back. When a user has information entered via the USER AGENT(browser) that must be stored via a POST, this unique secured data element would be sent via HTTPS such that they are validated prior to data base insertion.
However, If there is NO secured piece of unique data that is supplied via the single sign on process, then there is no way to guarantee unauthorized access. The access_token is the one piece of data that is utilized by Facebook to make the HTTPS calls into the GRAPH API. it is considered unique in regards to BOTH the USER and the APPLICATION and is initially secure via the signed_request packaging. If however, it is subsequently transmitted in the clear and if I can sniff the wire and obtain the access_token, then I can pretend to be the application and gain the information they have authorized the application to see. I tried the above example from a Safari and IE browser and it returned all of my information to me in the browser.
In conclusion, the access_token is part of the signed_request and that is how the application initially obtains it. After OAuth authentication and authorization, i.e., the USER has logged into Facebook and then runs your app, the access_token is stored as mentioned above and I have sniffed it such that I see it stored in a Cookie that is transmitted over the wire, resulting in there being NO UNIQUE SECURED IDENTIFIABLE piece of information that can be used to support interaction with the database, or in other words, unless there were one more piece of secure data sent along with the access_token to my database, i.e., a password, I would not be able to discern if it is a legitimate call. Luckily I utilized secure AJAX via POST and the call has to come from the same domain, but I am sure there is a way to hijack that.
I am totally open to any ideas on this topic on how to uniquely identify my USERS other than adding another layer (password) via this single sign on process or if someone would just share with me that I read and analyzed my data incorrectly and that the access_token is always secure over the wire.
Mahalo nui loa in advance.
I am not terribly familiar with Facebook's authentication/authorization methods, but I do believe that they implement oauth (or something close to it) for delegation, distributed authorization, and "single sign-on".
OAuth is described by RFC-5849
EDIT: Facebook Uses OAuth 2.0 which is still in working draft.
In OAuth, and similar systems, the "access_token" is only part of the picture. There is also typically a secret key, which is known only by the service provider (facebook) and the client application (your app). The secret key is the only part that is expected to stay secret - and that part is never sent over the wire (after it's initial issuance).
In the case of Facebook, I think the secret key is assigned to you when you register your application to use their API, and the 'access_token' is returned to you for a given user, whenever the user agrees to allow your app to access their info.
Messages are sent in the clear, including the user's username, and the relevant "access_token"; However, each message must also include a valid signature in order to be accepted by the server. The signature is a cryptographically computed string, that is created using a technique called HMAC.
Computing the HMAC signature requires both the token and the secret, and includes other key parts of the message as well. Each signature is unique for the given message contents; and each message uses a nonce to ensure that no two messages can ever be exactly identical.
When the server receives a signed message, it starts by extracting the access_token (clear-text), and determining which app the token was issued for. It then retrieves the matching secret from its own local database (the secret is not contained in the message). Finally, the server uses the clear-text message, the clear-text access_token, and the secret to compute the expected HMAC signature for the message. If the computed signature matches the signature on the received message, then the message must have been sent by someone who knows the same secret (i.e. your application).
Have a look at Section 3.1 of RFC-5849 for an OAuth specific example, and further elaboration on the details.
Incidentally, the same approach is used by Amazon to control access to S3 and EC2, as well as most other service providers that offer API access with long-term authorization. Suffice it to say - this approach is secure. It might be a little counter-intuitive at first, but it makes sense once you think it through.
Adding a few links and quotes from Facebook Documentation:
Facebook is indeed using the HMAC-SHA256 algorithm. Registration document (PHP Example reading signed_request section).
Always verify the signed_request:
If you are unable to validate the
signed_request because you can't embed
your application secret (e.g. in
javascript or a desktop application)
then you MUST only use one piece of
information from the payload, the
oauth_token.
The Authentication Document contains a lot of useful info about the different flows you may use to authenticate a user. Also read the Security Considerations section at the bottom of the page:
Cross site request forgery is an
attack in which an trusted
(authenticated and authorized) user
unknowingly performs an action on
website. To prevent this attack, you
should pass an identifier in the state
parameter, and then validate the state
parameter matches on the response. We
strongly recommend that any app
implementing Facebook user login
implement CSRF protection using this
mechanism.
It was confirmed by Facebook that indeed there is one call in which the access_token is broadcast in the open - it just happens to be one call I use to make sure that the user is still logged in before saving to my application database. Their recommendation was to use the SSL option provided as of last month for canvas and Facebook as a whole. For the most part the Auth and Auth are secure.
To ensure a secure interface between a third party application and a Facebook application or even any website that uses Facebook Single Sign on, an identity question would provide the extra layer when used in conjunction with the access_token.
Either that or require your users to use Facebook with the new SSL feature of Facebook and Facebook Canvas Applications. If the access_token is broadcast in the open it cannot be used to uniquely identify anyone in your third party database when needing to have a confirmed identity before database interactions.

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